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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Translational medicine” is a term that has come to signify the focused ef-
forts of bench scientists, drug developers, and clinical researchers to develop 
new medical products and improve health.1  Translational medicine is some-
times referred to as “molecular” or “personalized” medicine, and it generally 
involves the study of “disease and its pathology at the molecular level . . . in-
cluding the levels of such molecules as DNA, RNA, proteins, and metabo-
lites.”2  The hope is that this research will lead to personalized health care 
products, reductions of adverse drug reactions, better methods of identifying 
individuals at risk for disease, and improvements in preventive care.3  It may 
also eliminate waste in our health care system by decreasing the use of ineffec-
tive medications and drugs that cause adverse reactions.4 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. BioBank Central, What is Translational Medicine?, http://www.biobankcentral.org/ 
translational/whatis.php (last visited Mar. 21, 2008). 
 2. Adam W. Culbertson, Stephen J. Valentine & Stephen Naylor, Personalized Medi-
cine: Technological Innovation and Patient Empowerment or Exuberant Hyperbole?, DRUG 
DISCOVERY WORLD 18, 23 (2007). 
 3. NAT’L CANCER INST., OFFICE OF BIOREPOSITORIES & BIOSPECIMEN RES., FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS, http://biospecimens.cancer.gov/resources/faqs/ [hereinafter NATIONAL 
CANCER INSTITUTE](last visited Feb. 16, 2008). 
 4. Barbara J. Evans, David A. Flockhart & Eric M. Meslin, Commentary: Creating In-
centives for Genomic Research to Improve Targeting of Therapies, 10 NATURE MEDICINE 1, 2 
(2004). 
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Biobanks provide vital resources for this industry.  Biobanks collect, 
store, process, and distribute biological specimens and associated patient data to 
allow researchers to study the connection between molecular information and 
patients’ clinical responses.5  Although scientists have long been pursuing re-
search on human biological materials, the recent mapping of the human genome 
coupled with improved information technology systems has created tremendous 
potential in biobank research. 
At least three legal issues may impede or slow down research from bio-
banks.6  First, the complex federal regulatory structure is ambiguous and inter-
nally inconsistent.7  Second, there are public fears that genetic information 
could be used as a basis for discrimination in health care insurance, life insur-
ance, employment and education.8  Addressing these concerns requires a care-
ful examination of the legal landscape governing genetic information because 
several (although not all) research projects using biobanked samples perform 
genetic analyses.  Third, the law is unclear regarding ownership of human tis-
sues, which has led to bitter disputes and lawsuits and creates uncertainty 
among potential purchasers of the tissue who wish to create commercial prod-
ucts from them.9 
The Indiana General Assembly may soon face pressure from both privacy 
advocates who wish to enhance patient protections, as well as those institutions 
or commercial sponsors who would like to streamline the process for collecting 
and using human tissues.  Examining the intersecting concerns regarding ge-
netic information and legal barriers to research and development will enable 
Indiana to address these issues proactively and hasten the realization of transla-
tional research’s promises of health care delivery.  Identifying areas of legal 
confusion and adopting a comprehensive legal framework for our state is cru-
cial to assisting the development of research discoveries originating from 
banked specimens. 
Part II of this Article discusses the current regulatory and legal environ-
ment of genetic research, the implications for biobank-related research, and the 
ethical values that should guide state legislative responses.  Part III outlines 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, supra note 3. 
 6. This is not meant to suggest that legal issues are the only ones affecting the pace of 
research.  There may be many other factors, including funding, but those are beyond the scope 
of this Article. 
 7. Barbara J. Evans & Eric M. Meslin, Encouraging Translational Research Through 
Harmonization of FDA and Common Rule Informed Consent Requirements for Research with 
Banked Specimens, 27 J. LEGAL MED. 119, 119 (2006). 
 8. Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab. 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998); Equal 
Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2002 WL 32155386 (E.D. 
Wis. 2002); Louise McIntosh Slaughter, Genetic Testing and Discrimination: How Private Is 
Your Information? 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 67, 71 (2006). 
 9. Gillian Haddow et al., Tackling Community Concerns About Commercialization and 
Genetic Research: A Modest Interdisciplinary Approach, 64 SOC. SCI. & MED. 272, 272 (2007); 
see also Radhika Rao, Genes and Spleens: Property, Contract, or Privacy Rights in the Human 
Body?, 35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 371, 372 (2007). 
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state legislative efforts to address the shortcomings of federal regulations.  Part 
IV describes Indiana’s current statutory law on genetic research and offers a 
comprehensive solution which the Indiana legislature may choose to adopt to 
address current legal uncertainties in a way that appropriately balances ethical 
values.  This final section also includes a description of statutory provisions, 
which include a plan for the Indiana State Department of Health to implement 
these legislative changes in a way that will encourage consistency among insti-
tutions and promote public support of translational research. 
II.  THE CURRENT REGULATORY AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR BIOBANK RESEARCH 
Part I of this Article describes the federal regulatory framework governing 
research with banked specimens and highlights current inconsistencies between 
the “Common Rule,” the “Privacy Rule” of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), and Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) regulations.  This section of the Article discusses barriers to donation, 
including public fears of discrimination in employment and insurance benefits 
based on an individual’s genetic information, and case law disputes related to 
ownership or disposition of donated specimens.  This section also reviews ethi-
cal considerations that states should balance when considering the legal frame-
work for genetic research from biobanks, including promoting research 
advancements, respecting individual autonomy, and ensuring individuals’ pri-
vacy and confidentiality. 
A.  Complex Federal Regulatory Framework 
Ambiguity and inconsistency plague the three primary federal regulations 
that govern biobanks.  The Common Rule was created under the Department of 
Health and Human Services ("DHHS”) to protect the rights and welfare of hu-
man subjects and applies to all non-exempt research conducted by or supported 
by seventeen federal agencies.10  Tissue donors are considered human research 
subjects only when their tissue is collected for an identified research project and 
the donor’s private information is readily identifiable by the investigator.11  This 
excludes any specimens that were collected in the past (for clinical or oth- 
er research uses), and potentially excludes specimens collected for future uses  
(in biobanks) that are not readily identifiable to the researcher.  However, the 
Common Rule does apply to identifiable coded samples collected, stored, and 
used in a biobank.  Informed consent is required for those research projects un-
                                                                                                                 
 
 10. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101 and 46.102 (2005) (regulations that define the Department of 
Health and Human Services’ research policies for protecting human research subjects). 
 11. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (2008). 
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less an Institutional Review Board (“IRB”) determines that it meets the follow-
ing four conditions: 
(1) The research involves no more than minimal risk to 
the subjects; (2) The waiver or alteration will not ad-
versely affect the rights and welfare of the subjects; (3) 
The research could not practicably be carried out with-
out the waiver or alteration; and (4) Whenever appropri-
ate, the subjects will be provided with additional 
pertinent information after participation.12 
The FDA does not follow the Common Rule, but has its own set of regu-
lations intended to protect the rights, safety, and welfare of subjects in FDA-
regulated clinical investigations.13  Unlike the Common Rule, its provisions do 
not distinguish between identifiable and non-identifiable tissues.  The FDA has 
similar rules regarding informed consent for human subjects, but it does not 
allow IRBs to waive those requirements under any circumstances.14 
Finally, the HIPAA Privacy Rule covers research uses of “protected 
health information” (“PHI”), which does not apply to the specimens them-
selves, but rather to the PHI associated with specimens.15  The Rule’s purpose 
is to protect individuals’ privacy, confidentiality, and security interests in their 
PHI.  In general, HIPAA’s Privacy Rule prevents a covered entity from disclos-
ing an individual’s PHI for research purposes without express authorization.  
Federal guidance asserts that the “creation of a research database or repository, 
and the use or disclosure of PHI from a database or repository for research, may 
each be considered a research activity under the Privacy Rule.”16  Both of those 
activities are thus subject to the Privacy Rule.  HIPAA governs coded or identi-
fiable data such as names, social security numbers and medical record numbers, 
and allows an individual to have the option to sign an authorization allowing 
the research institution to have access to this information.  HIPAA’s Privacy 
Rule does not apply to data if it has been de-identified through statistically-
approved methods or if most personal identifying information has been re-
moved.  However, some categories of information which link an individual to a 
particular population group (race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status) may re-
main intact and still be considered legally de-identified.  The Privacy Rule also 
permits the use of limited data sets, which must be stripped of direct identifiers, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d) (2007). 
 13. 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 56, 812 (2008). 
 14. Evans & Meslin, supra note 7, at 129. 
 15. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.103 & 164 (2008). 
 16. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, RESEARCH REPOSITORIES, DATABASES, AND THE 
HIPAA PRIVACY RULE (2004), available at http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pdf/rese 
arch_repositories_final.pdf. 
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but may include indirect identifiers such as birth date and treatment date.  Lim-
ited data sets must be accompanied by a data use agreement.17 
These regulations and associated guidance fail to provide researchers clear 
directives, particularly with regard to informed consent requirements.  Three 
examples typify the ensuing confusion.  First, both the Common Rule and 
HIPAA are unclear about whether subjects may give informed consent for fu-
ture, unspecified uses of their tissues, though the practice is widespread and not 
expressly prohibited.18  Second, the Common Rule and FDA regulations are 
inconsistent regarding the ability of IRBs to waive the requirement for written 
informed consent.19  Third, there is conflicting guidance on whether the in-
formed consent statement may be used, in part, as a vehicle by which subjects 
waive future rights to profit from commercial products created from their tis-
sues.20   
Federal regulations provide ambiguous and inconsistent guidance, and 
they also leave a sector of the research community unregulated.  States relying 
solely on federal regulations have no control over research that may be per-
formed by private institutions or corporations.  Private research institutions or 
repositories that do not receive federal funding are not bound by federal regula-
tions that govern human subject research and the confidentiality of personal 
health information.  In addition, federally regulated researchers, hospitals, and 
providers sometimes sell or donate collected data and tissues to commercial 
research sponsors who make additional use of the data and materials that may 
not be consistent with the informed consent form originally signed by the sub-
ject.  As one attorney with experience negotiating these agreements notes:  
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. Limited data sets are data sets stripped of certain direct identifiers that are specified in 
the Privacy Rule.  These data sets may be used or disclosed only for public health, research, or 
health care operations purposes.  They are not considered de-identified information under the 
Privacy Rule.  Before disclosing a limited data set to a researcher, a covered entity must enter 
into a data use agreement with the researcher, identifying the researcher as the recipient of the 
limited data set, establishing how the data may be used and disclosed by the recipient, and pro-
viding assurances that the data will be protected, among other requirements.  See 45 C.F.R. § 
164.514 (2006). 
 18. Mark Barnes & Kate Gallin Heffernan, The ‘Future Uses’ Dilemma: Secondary Uses 
of Data and Materials by Researchers and Commercial Research Sponsors, 3 MED. RES. LAW & 
POL’Y 440, 442 (2004). 
 19. The Common Rule states that an IRB can waive the requirement to obtain informed 
consent for research when four conditions are met.  45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d).  By contrast, the 
FDA does not allow IRBs to waive the informed consent requirement.  21 C.F.R. § 50.20 
(1999). 
 20. The Office of Protection of Research Risks (“OPRR”), now the Office for Human 
Research Protections (“OHRP”), has stated guidance that its “regulations are not intended to 
prohibit the informed subject from making a legitimate donation.”  Letter from F. William 
Dommel, Jr., J.D., Dir., Div. of Compliance, OPRR, to Merel P. Glaubiger, Univ. Counsel, 
Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley (Mar. 21, 1989) (quoted in Barnes & Heffernan, supra note 18, at 
445).  The FDA states that donors cannot waive rights as condition for study participation, and 
that the word “donation” should not be used because it connotes abandonment.  FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., INFORMATION SHEETS: GUIDANCE FOR INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS AND CLINICAL 
INVESTIGATORS, 1998 UPDATE (1998). 
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[O]ver the past years, massive quantities of subjects’ da-
ta and biologic materials have been handed over to 
commercial sponsors that are largely unrestrained by 
contract or by regulation from doing with these data and 
tissue as they will—and they may even be free, from a 
legal perspective, to use subjects’ data for marketing 
surveys and direct patient marketing.21 
These research sponsors are subject to FDA regulations only if they are 
using the research to support an FDA application.  Otherwise, this use of data 
and tissues takes place without oversight from the IRB of the institution where 
the tissue was collected, and without being regulated by the Common Rule, 
FDA, or HIPAA.  Commercial sponsors may voluntarily enter into clinical trial 
agreements (“CTA”) with institutions from which they acquire tissues, but 
those CTAs rarely contain provisions relating to the privacy of personal health 
information.22 
B.  Public Fears of Genetic Discrimination 
Vague and inconsistent federal regulation of biobank research likely has a 
chilling effect on researchers and investors, but it is the fear of genetic dis-
crimination that appears to have captured the public’s imagination.  Statistics 
show that the public’s willingness to allow employers or insurance providers 
access to their genetic testing results has decreased over the past few years.  
According to studies conducted by Johns Hopkins’ Genetics and Public Policy 
Center, in 2002 eighty-five percent of individuals surveyed did not want em-
ployers to have access to their genetic information.23  That number increased to 
ninety-two percent by 2004.  Individuals also expressed similar opinions about 
health insurers’ access to genetic information.  In 2002, sixty-eight percent of 
surveyed individuals said their genetic information should be kept private from 
health insurers, and by 2004, this number rose to eighty percent.24  Studies 
show that public apprehension derives from the possibility of discrimination or 
“misuse of genetic testing results by insurance companies or employers.”25 
Currently, no federal prohibition exists to prevent discrimination based on 
genetic characteristics.26  Some states have addressed the absence of federal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. Barnes & Heffernan, supra note 18, at 442. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Slaughter, supra note 8, at 71. 
 24. See id.; see also Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, Privacy and Confidentiality 
of Genetic Information: What Rules for the New Science?, 2 ANN. REV. GENOMICS HUM. 
GENETICS 401, 406-07 (2001) (discussing focus group results of public support and willingness 
to contribute to genetic research). 
 25. Yeal Bregman-Eschet, Who Controls Our Genetic Privacy?, 23 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 13 (2006). 
 26. The Genetic Information and Nondiscriminatory Act of 2008 (GINA), H.R. 493, 
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regulation by enacting statutory prohibitions related to genetic discrimination in 
employment or insurance contexts.  “Most states prohibit employers from re-
quiring genetic testing as a pre-employment condition or ban its use in health 
insurance altogether.”27  Despite these statutory provisions, some statutes do not 
apply to discrimination in all insurance related contexts, protect individuals 
only as long as they are asymptomatic, or do not apply to insurance acquired 
through an employer.28  State law also differs when defining what constitutes 
discrimination, or whether the law provides any legal remedy to the aggrieved 
individual.29 
Some scholars, including Henry Greely, argue that widespread public fear 
is unfounded because few cases of genetic discrimination have been docu-
mented.30  However, people’s concerns do not seem irrational in light of the 
nature of documented cases.  In Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley 
Laboratory, administrative and clerical workers filed suit arising from their 
employers’ mandatory “employment entrance exams.”31  The employer condi-
tioned employment on these “health evaluations,” ordered the employees to 
contribute blood and urine samples, and then used those samples to conduct 
genetic testing to identify whether the potential employee had a sickle cell trait 
and other, non-genetic health conditions.32 
Although Norman-Bloodsaw occurred prior to substantial state legislation 
intended to protect against genetic discrimination, a more recent case suggests 
                                                                                                                 
110th Congress, passed the House and the Senate on April 24th, 2008, and is awaiting Presiden-
tial approval.  It is expected that President Bush will sign the bill into law.  GINA, first intro-
duced in 1995 as the Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act, prevents insurers from 
denying “insurance coverage or adjust[ing] premium rates paid by the individual or the group to 
which the individual belongs.”  And, in the context of employment, GINA bars both public and 
private sector employers “from making employment related decisions based on genetic informa-
tion of applicants and employees.”  It would make it unlawful to refuse to hire or discharge em-
ployees based on genetic information.  Included in the GINA definition of genetic information is 
an applicant’s/employee’s family history.  See Slaughter, supra note 8, at 74. 
 27. Jonathan Weems, A Proposal for a Federal Genetic Privacy Act, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 
109, 117 (2003). 
 28. See Mark Rothstein, Expanding the Ethical Analysis of Biobanks, 33 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 89, 90 (2005) (Rothstein notes that some statutes would not prohibit the employer from 
“obtaining the results of genetic tests recorded in individual medical records.”).  But see Henry 
Greely, Genotype Discrimination: The Complex Case for Some Legislative Protection, 149 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1483, 1488-99 (2001) (Greely distinguishes that medical underwriting may only 
apply in circumstances where an individual purchases individually underwritten health care 
coverage.  According to Greely, the majority of Americans (including Medicare or Medicaid 
beneficiaries) are covered without regard to their future risk). 
 29. Some states prohibit discrimination based on genetic results only in some contexts, 
but allow genetic results to be used as a factor to determine actuarial risk or when allocating life 
insurance.  Cf. N.Y. CIV RTS. LAW § 79-l (McKinney 1997) and N.M. CODE ANN. § 24-21-4 
(2005); see also Weems, supra note 27, at 117-18. 
 30. Greely, supra note 28, at 1490.  Greely also maintains that the rarity of genetic mark-
ers for diseases, the weakness of genetic markers in making predictions, the speed of employee 
turnover, and health care costs would prevent any recognizable financial incentives for employer 
insurance providers to discriminate on the basis of genetic testing results. 
 31. See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1271 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
 32. Id. 
Copyright 2008, The Trustees of Indiana University. Reproduced with the permission of the Indiana Health Law Review.
2008]  A PROPOSAL FOR COMPREHENSIVE BIOBANK RESEARCH LAWS 225 
 
genetic discrimination still may pose a concern.  In 2001, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) filed a claim against the Burlington 
Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company (“BNSF”) alleging Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) violations.  The EEOC claimed that BNSF was re-
questing employees who developed carpal tunnel syndrome, a work-related in-
jury, to undergo a medical evaluation which included a diagnostic blood test for 
a genetic marker related to carpal tunnel syndrome.  The unreported settlement 
agreement enjoined BNSF from requiring or requesting current or former em-
ployees to submit to genetic testing and ordered BNSF to return the genetic 
samples to the employees.33  However, the agreement did not prevent BNSF 
from requiring a genetic test for future employees or as a condition of employ-
ment. 
Discrimination based on genetic results may also be underestimated be-
cause it is difficult to document and prove.  Individual members of the public 
and employers may interpret results of potentially stigmatizing group-based 
genetic research and implicate other members of the group through unconscious 
or unspoken bias.34  Unlike other instances of discrimination, individuals may 
not even be aware that their genetic information has been collected or is being 
used in a discriminatory manner. 
C.  Ambiguity Regarding Tissue Ownership 
Issues of control arise when individuals’ biological specimens and sam-
ples are used by researchers, and the use does not conform to the individual’s 
expectations or to the actual informed consent agreement.35  Members of the 
public may also believe that they “own” their genetic material; thus, an institu-
tion’s or court’s assertion to the contrary is seen as an assault on privacy or dig-
nity.36  Many of the current informed consent statements used during the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 33. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., No. 02-C-
0456, 2002 WL 32155386 (E.D. Wis. May 8, 2002); see also Press Release, EEOC Settles ADA 
Suit Against BNSF for Genetic Bias (April 18, 2001), available at http://www.eeoc 
.gov/press/4-18-01.html. 
 34. Rothstein, supra note 28, at 91; see also Alice Hsieh, A Nation’s Genes for a Cure to 
Cancer: Evolving Ethical, Social, and Legal Issues Regarding Population Genetic Databases, 
37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 359, 410 (2004). 
 35. See Jasper Bovenberg, The New Case for an Inalienable Property Right in Human 
Biological Material: Empowerment of Sample Donors or a Recipe for a Tragic Anti-Commons? 
1 SCRIPT-ED 545 (2004), available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk./ahrc/script-ed/issue4/bovenberg 
.asp; see also Haddow et al., supra note 9. 
 36. See Marina Whelan, What, If Any, Are the Obligations of the U.S. Patent Office?: A 
Closer Look at the Biological Sampling of Indigenous Populations, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 
(2006) available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2006DLTR0014.html.  Whe-
lan notes that the UN has supported the view that individuals should have property rights in 
their biological material and should not be forced to assimilate to the framework adopted by 
some researchers.  Unlike the UN’s view, Henry Greely believes that once genetic material is 
separated from the body, the individual no longer shares a relationship with the genetic material. 
 Id., citing Henry T. Greely, Symposium: International Health Law, The Control of Genetic 
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procurement of genetic specimens explicitly state that the donor has no express 
interest or right to their genetic sample following donation.37 
Some tissue donors wish to place limitations or impose a governance 
structure on the institution to limit the scope, type, or location of the research as 
a condition of donation.  Empirical research studying public attitudes regarding 
hypothetical research scenarios as well as actual donors’ attitudes indicates that 
certain members of the public value the following factors, by being able to: (1) 
authorize the use of their genetic sample for only a particular type of research; 
(2) prevent the genetic sample from being used for other types of research not 
authorized; (3) limit where the research is being conducted (i.e. authorizing 
research only at this specific institution, research only by public or non-profit 
corporations, research only in the United States); or (4) limit the time period for 
usage.38 
As legal scholar Radhika Rao has noted, courts addressing ownership dis-
putes have generally refused to recognize an individual’s property right in ex-
cised specimens, but do recognize an institution’s right to maintain, use, or 
develop products resulting from the specimens.39  There are several notable ex-
amples of these conflicts.  Moore v. Regents of the University of California40 is 
the classic case, in which John Moore, a patient who underwent treatment for 
leukemia at the UCLA Medical Center, brought an action against his physician 
and the UCLA Board of Regents when he discovered that they created a pat-
ented cell line from his tissues without his knowledge or consent.  The Moore 
court set what became a very influential judicial precedent when it held that 
Moore’s excised tissues were not his property, but belonged to the researchers 
who used them to develop cell lines.41 
                                                                                                                 
Research: Involving the “Groups Between,” 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1397, 1414-15 (1997). 
 37. Gary Marchant, Property Rights and Benefit-Sharing for DNA Donors? 45 
JURIMETRICS J. 153, 155 (2005). 
 38. Paul Helft et al., Cancer Patients’ Attitudes Toward Future Research Uses of Stored 
Human Biological Materials, 2 J. EMPIRICAL RES. HUM. RES. ETHICS 15, 18-19 (2007).  Helft et 
al. studied the attitudes of cancer patients who had contributed tissue samples to a tissue bank.  
Helft found that respondents were more likely to disagree with using their stored tissues for 
future studies on diseases other than their type of cancer.  Respondents were also less likely to 
be willing to allow their tissue samples to be used by researchers not affiliated with local re-
searchers.  Haddow et al.’s interviewed focus groups to obtain public opinion s relating to Gen-
eration Scotland, an arm of U.K. Biobank.  Although this study was conducted in Scotland, 
several of the responses are relevant and echo concerns arising in U.S. judicial disputes.  Several 
respondents stated that they would have reservations about donating specimens for mental 
health research, and viewed this category of research as potentially stigmatizing.  Respondents 
also noted that they felt apprehension relating to research uses not specifically authorized, stat-
ing that all research uses should be disclosed and the specimens should only be used for the 
purpose to which the donor specifically consents.  Gillian Haddow et al., Generation Scotland 
Preliminary Consultation Exercise 2003-2004: Public and Stakeholder Views from Focus 
Groups and Interviews, available at http://129.215.140.49/gs/documents/initialconsultation.pdf; 
see also Haddow et al., supra note 9. 
 39. Rao, supra note 9, at 372. 
 40. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
 41. The majority reasoned that recognizing a property right would unnecessarily hinder 
medical research.  See Bregman-Eschet, supra note 25, at 25 for a full discussion of arguments 
against granting individuals’ property rights in their biological specimens and genetic informa-
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Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital42 followed Moore’s nonbinding 
decision, rejecting recognition of an individual property right in excised speci-
mens or in a derivation of one’s gene sequence.  In Greenberg, donors of hu-
man tissue and fluids, physicians doing research on Canavan disease, and 
private organizations sued physician, Dr. Reuben Matalon, a physician who 
obtained and licensed a patent for a gene causing the disease.  Consistent with 
Moore’s rejection of individual interests, Greenberg held that the gene patent 
for Canavan disease conferred a property right to researchers and hospitals, but 
not to the donors whose DNA contained this gene.43  Greenberg also implicitly 
rejected the equity concern of ensuring that specimen donors can benefit or ob-
tain access to any research discoveries resulting from their donations.  In this 
case, the individuals and family members who had donated tissue to Dr. Mata-
lon to study Canavan disease were in some instances unable to obtain the 
screening test Dr. Matalon developed due to its high cost.44 
Washington University v. Catalona45 followed the Greenberg ownership 
precedent, holding that once an individual donates specimens to a research in-
stitution, the individual no longer has any legal property claim to the specimens 
that would allow the individual to redirect or transfer the specimens.46  In Cata-
lona, Washington University sought a court’s declaration that it owned speci-
mens collected for prostate cancer research so that it could prevent the donors 
of those specimens from transferring them to another research facility with a 
particular researcher, Dr. Catalona.47  The court in Catalona also affirmatively 
supported the research institution’s right to the specimens over the rights of 
individual researchers.48 
The court in Tilousi v. Arizona State Board of Regents49 similarly de-
clined to recognize the ability of an individual to control the use of a specimen 
after donation, and it resolved questions related to research breadth in favor of 
the institution.50  In Tilousi, members of the Havasupai tribe objected to the 
researchers’ use of genetic samples that they donated specifically for diabetes 
research, but which researchers used to study schizophrenia and inbreeding.51  
According to members of the tribe, they would not have initially provided the 
donations if they had known that the researcher would carry out stigmatizing 
research to which they had not consented. 
                                                                                                                 
tion; see Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 492-495; see also Rao, supra note 
9, at 372. 
 42. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Res. Inst., 264 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1074-75 (S.D. 
Fla. 2003). 
 43. Id.; see also Rao, supra note 9, at 372. 
 44. Greenberg, 264 F.Supp.2d at 1067. 
 45. Washington Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 675 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 46. Id. at 667, 675-77. 
 47. Id. at 672. 
 48. Id. at 674-75. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Tilousi v. Ariz. State Bd. of Regents, Order no. 04-CV-1290-PCT-FJM (2004). 
 51. Id. 
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Currently, only one case departs from judicial precedent favoring institu-
tions, but the outcome is consistent with prior decisions in Moore, Greenberg, 
and Catalona in that the court seeks to maximize research using donated spe-
cimens.  In Cornyn v. Fifty-Two Members of the Schoppa Family,52 members of 
the Schoppa family sought to ensure that the specimens of brains from their 
deceased family members and other genetic samples were actually put to con-
structive use for Alzheimer’s research.53  In this case, the university to which 
they donated the tissues had halted their research efforts.  While Cornyn was 
more favorable to the plaintiffs, the court’s decision only held that the plaintiffs 
had standing to bring their claim for enjoining the destruction of the materials 
that they or their family members had donated.54  
As the preceding cases demonstrate, current jurisprudence rejects several 
of the issues some members of the public believe to be important, such as the 
recognition of an individual’s ability to place limitations or conditions on his or 
her donation.55 
Additional concerns arise in the context of downstream products.  Donors 
to biobanks generally want assurances that they will benefit from any screening 
tests, treatments, or medications developed through research using their dona-
tions, and they do not always trust the institution to ensure reasonable access.  
Once researchers have patented a cell line, the current legal framework allows 
the patent holder to sit on the patent where the holder would not develop useful 
continuing research of the cell line or develop a product such as a genetic 
screening test for the patented cell line.  A patent holder’s exclusionary rights 
would also prevent other researchers from using the patented cell line to de-
velop further technologies.56   
In several situations where researchers have patented a downstream prod-
uct developed from donated biological materials, the donors themselves have 
been unable to benefit from the technological advancement.57  This exclusion of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 52. Cornyn v. Fifty-Two Members of the Schoppa Family, 70 S.W.3d 895 (Tx. Ct. App. 
2001). 
 53. Id. at 900-01. 
 54. The court in Cornyn did not directly rule on the issue of whether the donors could 
actually prevent the destruction of their tissues, nor did the court rule that the donors could re-
quire constructive use of their tissues.  Id. 
 55. Rather than participating in research through the current institutional framework like 
in Tilousi, PXE created their own contractual model whereby they created a biobank and enter 
into written agreements with researchers who submit to PXE’s conditions.  See Kevin Ober-
dofer, The Lessons of Greenberg: Informed Consent and the Protection of Tissue Sources’ Re-
search Interests, 93 GEO. L.J. 365, 390-91 (2004). 
 56. Pilar Ossorio proposed to address this potential technological stall by stipulating that 
if patent holders sat on their patent, they could be legally required to license their patents to 
entities that would constructively develop further technology.  Pilar Ossorio, The Human Ge-
nome as Common Heritage: Common Sense or Legal Nonsense? 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 425, 
435 (2007). 
 57. See Lori Andrews, Harnessing the Benefits of Biobanks, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 22, 22 
(2005). 
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benefits poses a serious concern to previous donors and, if not addressed, could 
hinder future willingness to donate.58 
D.  Implications of the Current Regulations on Biobank Research 
Although the current legal and regulatory environment for biobank re-
search is confusing and sometimes inconsistent, there are some positive impli-
cations for states that choose not to legislate further, but to rely on the legal 
status quo.  As noted above, current regulatory ambiguities have been inter-
preted in favor of the research institution and allow institutions greater control 
over donated specimens.  Federal regulations may be revised, and those revi-
sions might reconcile the current inconsistencies.  However, the status quo also 
has troubling implications for biobank research.  The regulatory ambiguities 
and inconsistencies hinder efficiency by chilling some researchers and IRBs, 
who would be more likely to engage in research or approve protocols if there 
were clear guidance regarding how to do it legally.  Long-term public support 
may be adversely affected when people learn about the amount of research that 
takes place outside federal regulatory supervision and IRB oversight.  The sta-
tus quo also fails to allay the public’s fears regarding genetic discrimination.  
Finally, the uncertainty about tissue ownership potentially decreases investment 
in biobank-related research due to fears of litigation over downstream products. 
 Some disease advocacy groups, distressed over the ways in which courts have 
resolved these disputes, have turned to negotiating contracts with researchers 
that give them intellectual property rights in commercial products; such ad hoc 
contract negotiations, however, undoubtedly have an adverse effect on effi-
ciency. 
E.  Ethical Considerations 
States considering whether to accept or attempt to change the status quo 
regarding biobank research may wish to consider the question in the context of 
three important ethical norms: the value of advancing medicine and improving 
health; respect for autonomy (or respect for persons); and the protection of pri-
vacy and confidentiality.  In typical biomedical research, the process of obtain-
ing informed consent (or refusal) requires “disclosure[s] about the purpose, 
risks, benefits and protections for confidential information [which] provide[s] 
participants with the opportunity to exercise autonomy by choosing to partici-
                                                                                                                 
 
 58. One way to address this concern is to create a regulatory provision that could ensure 
donors have free access to tests, treatments, or medications developed from their donations.  See 
Melanie Baird, When and Why Does What Belong to Whom? A Proposed Model for the Interna-
tional Protection of Human Donors of Biological Material, CAN.-U.S. L.J. 331, 345 (2006).  
Iceland’s agreement with deCode Genetics contained a similar provision which allowed Ice-
landers free access to drugs developed by deCode for the duration of the patent period.  See Rao, 
supra note 9, at 375. 
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pate in the study of a drug or device.”59  The presentation of this information 
allows research participants to weigh the relative importance of these some-
times conflicting values themselves.  The traditional paradigm is complicated in 
cases of research originating in biobanks, which are “research platforms that 
may involve hundreds of different research initiatives spread over a long period 
of time.”60  It therefore becomes difficult, expensive, and sometimes impossible 
to obtain informed consent for specific projects.  In addition, the vast number of 
collaborative arrangements between the researchers who first collect data or 
tissues, and the subsequent users of that information, severs the relationship 
between researchers and tissue donors, and sometimes removes the research 
from federal regulatory oversight. 
The first important value is that of advancing medicine and improving 
health, which can be best accomplished by laws and procedures that maximize 
the efficiency of the process of collecting and using biological samples and 
data, and allows the greatest access possible to richly annotated samples.  The 
promise of this kind of research extends to nearly every area of medicine, from 
personalized clinical therapy to broad-based public health efforts, and it is also 
presumed to serve the economic interests of the community by creating jobs.  
However, it is possible that an overly vigorous pursuit of research efficiency 
can backfire, particularly if this goal is pursued in ways incompatible with re-
spect for individual choice and protection of donors from potentially discrimi-
natory uses of their information.  For example, researchers collecting biological 
samples were seen as exploitative of indigenous peoples in Alaska.61  Alaska 
responded with a set of laws so protective of donors that it is unlikely that 
Alaska would ever be capable of fostering a robust genetic research agenda.62 
The second important value is respect for autonomy, which concerns the 
long-standing legal and ethical norm that individuals have the right to make 
important choices about their own lives.  A robust understanding of respect for 
autonomy focuses on the well-informed choices of individuals with regard to 
the research uses of information and/or tissue samples.  For instance, individu-
als may affirmatively choose to participate in certain kinds of research (such as 
breast cancer or Alzheimer’s disease) or purposefully avoid potentially stigma-
tizing research or research that is morally objectionable for more idiosyncratic 
reasons (such as religious or philosophical objections to certain practices).  
Some argue that the robust conception of autonomy is not relevant in the case 
of research involving tissue samples because the donors of those samples (and 
the corresponding information related to them) are not human research subjects 
                                                                                                                 
 
 59. Timothy Caulfield, Russell Brown, & Eric M. Meslin.  Challenging a Well Estab-
lished Consent Norm? One Time Consent for Biobank Research, 4 J. INT’L BIOTECH. L. 69, 70 
(2007). 
 60. Id. at 70. 
 61. Brett Shelton, Consent and Consultation in Genetic Research on American Indians 
and Alaska Natives, Indigenous Peoples Council on Biocolonialism, http://www.ipcb.org/pub 
lications/briefing_papers/files/consent.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2008). 
 62. ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.13.010 & 18.13.030 (2008). 
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in the classic sense.63  However, for those who believe that respect for auton-
omy continues to be important after tissue collection, there is a kind of ethical 
zero-sum game; increasing individual control decreases the efficiency and value 
of the genetic research that can be done. 
A third important ethical value implicated by genetic research is the re-
sponsibility to protect the privacy and confidentiality of individuals’ health in-
formation in order to guard against insurance and employment discrimination.  
This has been the focus of many state genetic privacy laws.64  Georgia’s state 
laws, for example, are structured to limit the use and availability of genetic in-
formation and prevent certain disclosures of genetic information to third par-
ties.65 
III.  STATE APPROACHES TO FEDERAL REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES IN 
GENETIC RESEARCH 
Part III describes how some state legislatures have addressed the inconsis-
tencies in federal law.  This portion of the Article first describes state legisla-
tures’ definitions of legal elements involved in the process of collection, 
research, usage, and storage of specimens and genetic information.  Next, this 
section describes how several states have adopted a mutually exclusive ap-
proach to legislation: either increasing research efficiency by decreasing auton-
omy and privacy for individual donors or increasing individual protections at 
the expense of research efficiency. 
A.  State Legislative Responses: An Overview of Legal Elements 
Several states have attempted to clarify the uncertainty in the federal regu-
latory framework by defining relevant terms related to the biobanking and ge-
netic research process.  The following is a summary of several existing state 
laws relating to the collection of biological specimens or genetic samples, stor-
age of genetic samples, and retention of genetic samples and genetic informa-
tion.  These provisions do not apply to genetic testing or analysis conducted in 
other contexts such as criminal identification purposes, paternity testing, or 
newborn screening.66 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1069 (S.D. 
Fla. 2003). 
 64. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-54-1 to 33-54-8 (2007); LA. STAT. ANN. 22:213.7 (2008); 
but see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-3 (West 2008). 
 65. Id. 
 66. It is important to note that states may differ in the way they define basic terms such as 
“DNA samples” or “genetic information”, and those definitions may affect the way a law is in-
terpreted.  For example, Oregon defines a DNA sample as the biological specimen collected for 
the purpose of extracting and analyzing DNA as well as the actual DNA extracted from the sam-
ple.  This definition affects how one would interpret a law which gives the requirements to col-
lect a DNA sample because that collection could mean obtaining a blood sample or extracting 
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1.  Personal Access to DNA Results 
If a physician or researcher is performing a genetic test or analysis, some 
states include provisions which describe how that information may be provided 
to the individual.  For instance, when signing the informed consent form to ob-
tain a genetic sample and analysis, Delaware requires that the person obtaining 
the sample provide the individual with the results of the analysis unless the in-
dividual directs otherwise.67  Some states also require that informed consent 
forms contain a request provision which allows an individual who contributed a 
sample for DNA analysis to request, inspect, or obtain his or her own genetic 
records.68 
2.  Informed Consent and Exemptions 
States vary widely with regard to informed consent requirements for the 
collection, use, or retention of a genetic sample and genetic information.  Sev-
eral states have exempted persons from obtaining informed consent before pro-
curing genetic information for medical repositories or medical and scientific 
research.  New Mexico provides that an individual’s DNA, genetic information, 
or a genetic analysis may be obtained, retained, transmitted, or used without a 
person’s written informed consent pursuant to federal regulations if that infor-
mation is for a medical repository or registry, or medical or scientific research.69 
 Nevada law also provides a similar exception, which states that if a researcher 
obtains the genetic information for use in a study where the identities of the 
individuals are not disclosed to the person conducting the study, then the indi-
vidual’s informed consent to obtain that genetic information is not required.70 
Oregon has created an “opt-out” notification system for researchers to col-
lect coded or identifiable samples without obtaining written informed consent 
provisions.  A researcher must notify the individual that his or her biological 
specimen or individual identifiable health information will be used for coded or 
anonymous research, and that the researcher may use the genetic sample and 
genetic information unless the individual responds to the notice indicating that 
he or she does not want the sample or information used.71  Researchers are not 
required to obtain any consent for collection or use of a DNA sample or genetic 
information which is de-identified or unidentified; they are also not required to 
provide individual notice when samples will be de-identified.72 
Alaska law requires a researcher to obtain written informed consent before 
collecting an individual’s DNA sample, performing a DNA analysis on that 
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 67. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1220 (2008). 
 68. ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010 (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1223 (2008); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 629.141 (2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.537 (2008). 
 69. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-3 (West 2008). 
 70. NEV. REV. STAT. § 629.151 (2003). 
 71. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.537–192.538 (2003). 
 72. OR. REV. STAT. § 192.537 (2008). 
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sample, retaining a DNA sample or the results of the DNA sample, or disclos-
ing the results of the DNA analysis.73  Some state laws specify that separate 
informed consent must be obtained for each action.  Delaware law outlines spe-
cific elements to satisfy the informed consent requirements.74  To obtain con-
sent for collection of a non-anonymous sample and to obtain a genetic analysis, 
Delaware requires the informed consent form to list a description of which ge-
netic tests will be performed, their purposes, potential uses, limitations, and the 
meaning of the results, as well as providing the individual with the test results 
unless the individual directs otherwise.  Delaware law also requires that the re-
tention portion of the informed consent form include a description of the ge-
netic information retained and its potential uses and limitations.  To disclose 
genetic information, the statute requires that the informed consent form provide 
an additional description of the information released and to whom it may be 
released.75 
3.  Retention and Destruction of DNA Samples and Genetic Information 
States vary widely with regard to researchers’ ability to retain an individ-
ual’s genetic sample and information, as well as whether a researcher is re-
quired to destroy an individual’s genetic sample upon request.  Several states 
specify the disposition of the genetic samples and/or genetic information in cir-
cumstances where an individual has not specifically requested sample destruc-
tion.  In Nevada, when an individual does not specifically request destruction of 
genetic information, the researcher must destroy the genetic information either 
after the completion of the study or after the individual withdraws from the 
study.76  In New Mexico and Oregon, a DNA sample from an individual that is 
used for non-anonymous research must be destroyed upon the completion of the 
project or if the individual withdraws from the project.77 
Some states, however, include a provision for continued use and retention 
of the genetic information and sample.  Nevada and Oregon law allows re-
searchers to retain genetic information after completion or withdrawal from the 
study by obtaining specific authorization from the individual.78  The New Mex-
ico statute also stipulates that an individual’s genetic samples and genetic in-
formation must be destroyed at the individual’s request, but this provision 
contains many significant exceptions.  The individual’s right to request destruc-
tion does not apply where an individual’s samples are used by an IRB-approved 
research protocol, if the samples are being used by an authorized medical repo-
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010 (2006). 
 74. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1220 (2008). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 629.161 (2000). 
 77. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-5 (West 2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.537 (2003). 
 78. NEV. REV. STAT. § 629.161 (2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.537 (2003). 
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sitory or registry, or for other medical or scientific research.79  Oregon law simi-
larly recognizes an individual’s general right to request destruction of a DNA 
sample, but specifies that this right does not apply to samples retained for coded 
or anonymous research samples collected from an individual who did not pre-
viously opt-out.80 
Alaska and Delaware statutes further clarify that a person must obtain in-
formed consent from an individual to retain a genetic sample or genetic infor-
mation.81  In Delaware, however, consent is not required if the sample is used 
for anonymous research.82  Delaware law requires researchers to comply with 
an individual’s request to destroy genetic samples, unless retention has been 
previously authorized by the individual or the sample is used for anonymous 
research where the identity of the individual will not be released.83  In Nevada, 
if an individual requests that a researcher destroy genetic information, the re-
searcher must comply with that request.84 
4.  Disclosure of Results 
State laws vary regarding the disclosure of genetic information to third 
parties, the process of disclosure, and limitations on disclosure.  New Mexico 
law expressly prohibits an insurer from discriminating against a person or a 
member of the person’s family on the basis of genetic analysis, genetic informa-
tion, or genetic propensity.85  Despite this provision, New Mexico does not pro-
hibit the use of genetic analysis, genetic information, or genetic propensity by 
an insurer in the ordinary course of business in connection with life, disability 
income, or long-term care insurance if the information is based on sound actu-
arial principles.86 
Georgia law requires that an individual’s genetic information be kept con-
fidential and may be released only to the individual and specific persons author-
ized by the individual.87  When a researcher obtains informed consent for the 
DNA analysis of the sample, the law specifies that this consent only allows the 
researcher to use the genetic information for the authorized research study, eli-
minating the possibility that the researcher could share or transfer the individ-
ual’s genetic information to a party outside of the research study.88 
Several states impose conditions for the release of genetic information to 
parties like insurance providers and specify actions prohibited by insurers who 
                                                                                                                 
 
 79. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-5 (West 2008). 
 80. OR. REV. STAT. § 192.537 (2003). 
 81. ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010 (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.16, § 1222 (2008). 
 82. Id. 
 83. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1222 (2008). 
 84. NEV. REV. STAT. § 629.170 (2000). 
 85. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-4 (West 2008). 
 86. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-21-3 – 24-21-4 (West 2008). 
 87. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-3 (2008); accord ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010 (2008). 
 88. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-6 (2008). 
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obtain this information.  Several states allow an individual to release his or her 
genetic information to insurers by means of an informed consent provision.  
Delaware law, for example, requires consent for the release of genetic informa-
tion to an insurer, and the insurer can retain the information only for the spe-
cific purpose and specific length authorized by the individual.89  Georgia law 
prohibits insurers from using released genetic information for any non-
therapeutic purpose.90 
Even some of the state laws that are framed as preventative measures 
against disclosure of genetic information contain significant exceptions.  Ore-
gon’s opt-out scheme allows any health care provider covered under HIPAA to 
disclose genetic samples or information for coded or anonymous research so 
long as the provider provides the individual with notice of the research and an 
opportunity to decline participation.91  If the health care provider is not a 
HIPAA-covered entity, the health care provider is not required to inform the 
individual of plans to disclose the genetic sample or protected health informa-
tion for coded or anonymous research process.92  Oregon law also provides that 
the publication of an individual’s genetic information or identity does not con-
stitute a disclosure if it is not due to willful neglect and if it is corrected before a 
third party learns of it or performs a genetic test on a tissue sample.93 
Florida law requires the individual’s consent to disclose the results of ge-
netic information, but the law also states that the health care provider must pro-
vide the individual with notice if the genetic information is used in any decision 
to grant or deny any insurance, employment, mortgage, loan, credit, or educa-
tional opportunity, suggesting that Florida law allows these decisions to be 
based on genetic information.94 
5.  Property Interests 
Few state laws address ownership issues related to genetic material or in-
formation.  Five states define DNA analysis test results as the exclusive prop-
erty right of the individual.95  Florida clarifies that this property right applies 
even if the results of the DNA analysis are held by a private entity.96  Oregon 
originally included in its law a definition of genetic information as the property of 
the individual, in “an attempt to solve several legal problems: providing guid- 
ance to the courts as to the nature of a person’s rights to genetic information, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 89. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16, § 1220 (2008). 
 90. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-4 (2008). 
 91. See OR. REV. STAT. § 192.538 (2003). 
 92. See id. 
 93. OR. REV. STAT. § 192.539 (2003). 
 94. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40 (West 2008). 
 95. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010 (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7 (West 
2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40 (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1 (2008); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 22:213.7 (2008). 
 96. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40 (West 2004). 
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allowing family ownership of genetic information, and implying a remedy for a 
blood relative of an individual who suffers discrimination.”97  It was later re-
pealed because, according to a pharmaceutical company, it negatively impacted 
research due to concerns that “a subject of research might later assert a claim to 
own the fruits of research and that a transfer of those rights to a researcher 
might be unenforceable.”98 
In addition to the results of the DNA analysis, Alaska is currently the only 
state to have a law that defines the actual DNA sample as the “exclusive prop-
erty” of an individual.  This severely or completely limits the possibility of us-
ing one’s genetic sample as the basis for a commercial product development.99 
6.  Civil and Criminal Liability 
States vary as to how, if at all, they address violations of the provisions 
discussed above.  States recognizing a person’s liability for violating these stat-
utes vary with regard to which individual (or individuals) has standing to bring 
a claim, who may be named as a breaching party, what applicable law an indi-
vidual may use to claim a breach or injury, and what damages the law makes 
available to complaining parties.  “Standing” is defined as “a person’s right to 
make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.”100  Standing 
refers to who can claim an injury by a physician or researcher’s violation of the 
statutes relating to genetic samples and information.  Some states, such as 
Alaska, define standing broadly, stating that “a person” may bring a claim.101  
New Mexico law specifies that “a person whose rights have been violated under 
the provisions” has standing,102 but it also permits the attorney general or dis-
trict attorney to initiate a civil action against a person for violations.103  Nevada 
defines standing so that it includes “any person who suffers an injury as a result 
of the disclosure,” explicitly expanding “standing” to more than the original 
genetic sample contributor.104 
The term “breaching party” refers to a person or entity who owes a legal 
duty to another person, and in violating that duty, has caused injury or harm to 
another person.105  In this context, the breaching party may be the physician, 
researcher, or institution that has a duty to the patients and participants to up-
hold and follow state laws when obtaining and using genetic samples and in-
formation.  If physicians or researchers do not follow these requirements, then 
                                                                                                                 
 
 97. History of Oregon’s Genetic Privacy Law, http://egov.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/gene 
tics/docs/History_of_Oregon2_07b.pdf, 2005, at 2 (referencing S.B. 276). 
 98. Id. 
 99. ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010 (2006). 
 100. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1442 (8th ed. 2004). 
 101. ALASKA STAT. §18.13.020 (2006). 
 102. N.M. STAT. § 24-21-6(B) (2008). 
 103. N.M. STAT. § 24-21-6 (2000). 
 104. NEV. REV. STAT. § 629.201 (2008). 
 105. See generally “breach,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 100, at 200. 
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they are breaching this duty.  Many of the states that allow civil relief define 
breaching party as “any individual” or “any person” who retains, obtains, or 
discloses an individual’s genetic sample or genetic information.106  States vary 
on the level of intent, if any, required to show a violation of these laws.  Gener-
ally, intent is defined as a person’s state of mind accompanying a certain act.  
This mental state may range from negligence to knowingly and willfully violat-
ing a law.  Several states rely on a strict liability standard with regard to intent, 
where the law recognizes a violation regardless of the person’s state of mind.  
For example, laws in Alaska and New Mexico specify that any violation of their 
statutes constitutes a potential claim.107  Delaware law requires an element of 
intent, and the individual bringing the claim must demonstrate that the person 
“willfully” violated the statutory provisions.108  In Oregon, there is a tiered sys-
tem based on levels of the alleged violator’s knowledge and intent, ranging 
from inadvertent violations to those knowingly committed.109 
Oregon is the only state that specifically allows the breaching party to use 
an affirmative defense.110  An “affirmative defense” is an argument which al-
lows the breaching party to defeat the injured party’s claim, even if all of the 
alleged violations are true.111  For example, a patient may allege that a re-
searcher disclosed the patient’s genetic sample and information to a third party, 
which would theoretically violate the law.  Nevertheless, even if the researcher 
did breach a duty, the researcher could demonstrate that he or she took action to 
correct the violation.  A court may accept that the researcher satisfied the re-
quirements of an affirmative defense by taking corrective action and rule in fa-
vor of the researcher.  This provision would allow a researcher or institution 
opportunities to correct violations, which would decrease a patient’s potential 
success in legal disputes. 
If a court finds that a person has violated the provisions of the law, the in-
jured party may be entitled to damages.  Damages are usually monetary in na-
ture, paid by the breaching party to the injured to compensate that person for 
his or her injury.  Some states specify the type of damages or the amount of 
monetary damages an injured individual may recover if successful.  Nevada law 
states that an individual is entitled to actual damages,112 while Oregon’s tiered 
system specifies dollar amounts, which the court may award for each particular 
violation.113  Some states, such as Georgia, mandate breaching insurers to pay 
actual damages or the court may order the insurer to provide the individual in-
surance coverage under the same terms had the violation not occurred.114 
                                                                                                                 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.020 (2006); N.M. STAT. § 24-21-5 (2008). 
 108. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1227 (2008). 
 109. OR. REV. STAT. § 192.541 (2003). 
 110. See id. 
 111. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 100, at 451. 
 112. NEV. REV. STAT. § 629.201 (2000). 
 113. OR. REV. STAT. § 192.541 (2003). 
 114. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-8 (2008). 
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Very few states recognize criminal liability for violations of the laws ref-
erenced above.115  Florida law states that a violation constitutes a Class A mis-
demeanor,116 while the laws in Alaska and Oregon specify that a level of intent 
is required to find a violation, such as the person knowingly or recklessly vio-
lated the corresponding statutory provisions.117 
B.  State Legislative Strategies to Protect Donors or Promote  
Research Efficiency 
State legislatures that appear to have a conscious strategy regarding ge-
netic research tend to pass laws that, in combination, either promote research 
efficiency, potentially at the behest of medical and pharmaceutical interests, or 
to enhance donor protections. 
1.  State Laws that Increase Protections for Tissue Donors 
 Some states have passed legislation that treat the collection of tissue and 
its related information just like other kinds of human subjects research.  This 
means that informed consent is required to obtain an individual’s samples and 
to perform genetic tests for research, but no attempts are made to streamline the 
consent procedures or requirements for the unique difficulties in research in-
volving biobanks and data repositories. 
Several states follow the traditional human subjects research model of ob-
taining informed consent for every collection and subsequent research proce-
dure, yet the states provide exceptions for anonymous research.  For example, 
Delaware requires a physician or researcher to obtain the patient’s written in-
formed consent for the sample collection, sample genetic analysis, and storage 
of the genetic sample, if the research is not anonymous.118  Florida defines a 
patient’s genetic information as his or her personal property, although this ele-
ment of the law focuses on protecting the patient’s confidentiality and prevent-
ing unauthorized disclosure and does not confer rights to direct the use of tissue 
or profit from commercial products.119  This model protects patients and donors 
from unwanted collection or unauthorized genetic research of their samples, but 
may not allow for maximum sample collection if the repository wishes to con-
                                                                                                                 
 
 115. See infra, notes113-115 and accompanying text. 
 116. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40 (West 2004). 
 117. ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.030 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.543 (2003). 
 118. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1221-1222 (2008). 
 119. See Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp., 264 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1069 (S.D. Fla. 
2003).  The court in Greenberg cites Section 760.40 of the Florida statute, which states that 
individuals contributing tissue for researchers do not relinquish ownership of the results of the 
analysis.  The court limited the application of this provision by holding it did not extend to any 
right relating to the development of commercial products, because the donors severed their in-
terest upon donating their tissues.  Greenberg, 264 F.Supp.2d at 1069. 
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duct coded research.120  Ensuring full informed consent for the collection of the 
biological specimen and all its genetic research uses may be costly, time con-
suming, and logistically complicated.  Some donors may also be hesitant to au-
thorize use of their samples if they are re-contacted by researchers, which could 
result in a loss of samples for continued use. 
Oregon has enacted laws that provide even greater protections for indi-
viduals.  Oregon’s laws are generally consistent with federal regulations.  There 
is, however, one important exception: individuals must have the opportunity to 
opt-out of anonymous or coded genetic research otherwise allowable in some 
circumstances under federal law.121  If patients do not respond to the notice in 
the allotted time period of six months to indicate that they do not want the sam-
ple or information used, then the physician or researcher may retain and use the 
sample and information.  If patients do not choose to opt-out, the tissues may be 
used for anonymous or coded research approved or exempted from approval by 
an IRB.  Interestingly, although Oregon’s law gives patients more protections 
than the federal regulations, much of the public response has been negative, 
because the public has realized for the first time that their health information or 
biological specimens can be used without their consent.  This is one gap in edu-
cation that Oregon’s Advisory Committee on Genetic Privacy and Research 
(“Oregon’s Advisory Committee”) is attempting to remedy.122  Since this re-
quirement became law in Oregon, it has caused some confusion in terms of how 
providers should present this information, and how laboratories can track sam-
ples of those who have opted out.123  The donor opt-out model requires an in-
formed public to work properly, and Oregon has created an Advisory 
Committee on Genetic Privacy and Research that has developed educational 
tools for IRBs, researchers, and health care consumers.124 
Alaska is the most restrictive state with regard to the collection and stor-
age of a patient’s genetic sample and information and strongly favors individual 
rights.  Alaska is the only state which defines an individual’s genetic sample as 
his or her personal property.  Alaska and Florida follow the consent require-
ments imposed in states like Delaware, but importantly require informed con-
                                                                                                                 
 
 120. Some states do not require consent for research using anonymous specimens.  Al-
though this is not recognized by federal law as human subjects research, it does not technically 
protect patients from all unwanted collections and uses of their specimens.  See DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 16, § 1227 (2008); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-l (McKinney 1997).  But see ALASKA STAT. § 
18.13.010 (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40 (West 2004) (language of statutes do not contain 
exemptions to use anonymous specimens for genetic research). 
 121. OR. REV. STAT. § 192.535(1)(b) (West 2007). 
 122. REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ASSEMBLY, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETIC PRIVACY 
AND RESEARCH 6 (Mar. 2007), http://egov.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/genetics 
/docs/ACGPR_030507.pdf [hereinafter OREGON’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE].  The Oregon statute 
states that coded or anonymous research thought to be exempt must be officially submitted to 
the IRB for exemption and the IRB may exempt this research from review.  OR. REV. STAT. § 
192.547(2) (West 2003). 
 123. OREGON’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 122, at 7. 
 124. See id. at 8. 
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sent even if research is anonymous.  Alaska’s strict laws are a response to sev-
eral historical breaches of research ethics involving the indigenous population, 
such as the Human Genome Diversity Project and the Genographic Project.125 
These approaches are diverse, but they all attempt to provide patients and 
tissue donors with greater control over what happens to their tissues.  The re-
quirements for informed consent extend to all researchers, not just those who 
are federally regulated, which closes a significant loophole.  Patients and do-
nors can therefore feel that they are more in control of whether and how their 
biological specimens are used.  In addition, they have corresponding control 
over the privacy of their information, at least to the extent that they can refuse 
to donate to research. 
 Exactly how these additional protections would impact research effi-
ciency is, in the end, an empirical question.  Still, it is worth speculating, par-
ticularly when states are keen to attract life sciences companies.  With these 
additional protections, research efficiency is partially subordinated to respect 
for autonomy and protection of privacy.  Depending on the state’s response, 
researchers would find additional requirements to obtain informed consent in 
cases in which it was previously unnecessary.  Delaware’s law, for instance, 
would impose many of the same hurdles that already exist, such as finding peo-
ple to obtain consent, ensuring that people read their mail to find out what’s 
happening, and the loss of samples to people who become annoyed by being re-
contacted, but who otherwise do not object.  In addition to these barriers, Ore-
gon faces the additional hurdle of providing notice to all health care providers 
of the legislative changes so that health care providers and clinics can adapt to 
these new laws.  Additionally, monitoring patient opt-out requests is challeng-
ing for laboratories (particularly when samples are sent from one lab to an-
other), and the costs of notifying consumers is significant (but it is not 
quantified in the Committee’s 2007 Report).126  In Alaska, the barriers to con-
duct genetic research may be insurmountably high.  Consent is required even 
for anonymous research, and ownership rights remain with individuals even, it 
would seem, after commercial products have been developed.127 
It is also not clear how these additional protections would affect public 
support of the research agenda of biobanks.  Anecdotal data from Oregon sug-
gests that consumers are dissatisfied that they are required to opt-out of certain 
kinds of genetic research, rather than affirmatively choosing to participate.128  
This data reveals that the public does not understand that its health information 
and biological samples are already used without consent in some circumstances 
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. Brett Shelton, Consent and Consultation in Genetic Research on American Indians 
and Alaska Natives, Indigenous Peoples Council on Biocolonialism, http://www.ipcb.org 
/pulications/briefing_papers/files/consent.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2008); Declaration of In-
digenous Peoples of the Western Hemisphere Regarding the Human Genome Diversity Project, 
http://www.tebtebba.org/tebtebba_files/susdev/bdv/iphgdp.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2008). 
 126. See OREGON’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 122. 
 127. ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010 (2006). 
 128. OREGON’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 122, at 7. 
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under federal law.  Although Oregon citizens receive additional protections un-
der their genetic privacy and research laws, they may become more suspicious 
and less supportive of research in general.  Therefore, on the one hand, it is en-
tirely possible that public support of biobank research will decrease, because 
people have a better understanding of what little protections they actually have. 
 On the other hand, it is possible that over time, Oregon citizens will support 
genetic research because they trust the researchers and feel that they have some 
control over the research projects that are undertaken. 
The range of patient protections in this area provides insight on several 
factors regarding the balance of efficiency and public involvement from which 
states may benefit.  Failing to inform the public and earn the public’s trust has 
resulted in either restrictively reactive laws or laws with which the public may 
not fully understand or agree.  Both responses, either fully protecting individual 
rights or only recognizing increased individual protections for certain types of 
research, impede efficiency when the laws are not balanced with a mechanism 
to streamline the research process for donors who do provide consent. 
2.  State Laws that Promote Research Efficiency 
Some states resolve the federal regulation’s ambiguity in favor of promot-
ing research efficiency, but in a way that provides limited usefulness for the 
development of translational medicine.  These states create extensive excep-
tions that allow a researcher or physician129 to obtain, store, and use biological 
specimens and medical information under federal regulatory exemptions, such 
as IRB waivers, or under a “medical or scientific research” exemption.130  
When collecting a sample under these laws, the researcher does not need to ob-
tain actual informed consent explaining that the sample will be used for re-
search or stored in a repository.  These laws also do not restrict the research to 
OHRP’s enumerated uses but rather allow researchers to store the genetic sam-
ple and information in a biobank for future unspecified uses or to use them in a 
specific research project.131  For example, this type of law would allow a re-
                                                                                                                 
 
 129. For the sake of brevity, the authors refer to the person obtaining, using, and retaining 
the genetic samples as the “researcher” or “physician.”  Many statutes use the general term “per-
son,” which, in addition to a physician or researcher, could include nurses, lab technicians, re-
search institutions, and hospitals.  The authors also use the term “patient” or “participant” to 
indicate the person donating the sample for genetic research.  Many statutes provide only a gen-
eral definition of “individual” when referring to the person donating the sample.  Individual 
state statutes should be consulted to determine the precise definition of each term in a particular 
state. 
 130. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-3 (West 2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 629.151 (West 2000); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 629.181 (West 2008). 
 131. This appears to be in conflict with federal guidance suggesting that merely collecting a 
human biological sample constitutes a single research activity, and any subsequent use of that 
tissue constitutes an additional research activity requiring separate consent.  See Barnes & Hef-
fernan, supra note 18, at 446. 
Copyright 2008, The Trustees of Indiana University. Reproduced with the permission of the Indiana Health Law Review.
242 INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:217 
 
searcher to collect a biological specimen for future biobank use without obtain-
ing the patient’s informed consent. 
Laws that enumerate informed consent exceptions are the most permissive 
and promote the use of genetic materials in research by exempting medical or 
scientific researchers from obtaining informed consent to store samples in a 
repository or to use them for genetic research.  Several states, such as New 
Mexico and Nevada, allow physicians and researchers to obtain, use, and retain 
a patient’s genetic sample as long as the genetic sample is used for “medical or 
scientific research”132 or the sample goes to a statewide repository.  Some states 
that use this model, such as New Mexico, place conditions on the confidential-
ity protocol to ensure genetic samples are coded or anonymous.  New Mexico 
also specifies that this exemption process must comply with relevant federal 
regulations.133 
Through the statutory exemptions or IRB waivers, these state laws resolve 
federal law ambiguities in favor of research efficiency, increasing the volume of 
samples collected for research or storage by eliminating the obstacles and costs 
associated with obtaining consent for each use.  However, despite its short-term 
research efficiency, this model has two substantial drawbacks for states hoping 
to support translational medicine.  First, data from samples that have been col-
lected without informed consent cannot be used to support FDA applications, 
with the possible exception of in vitro diagnostic devices under certain circum-
stances.134  Second, this model poses a high risk of public backlash because it 
promotes the importance of research advancements without obtaining the per-
mission of individuals whose materials may be used, and without engaging the 
public to gain its informed support. 
IV.  INDIANA’S LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS 
Part IV describes current Indiana statutes involving genetic information.  
Indiana has very few laws related to this subject, and could benefit from further 
legislation regarding biological specimens and genetic information in biobank-
ing research.  However, arguably, none of the approaches discussed with pre-
vious state efforts strikes the right balance among the ethical values at stake.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 132. The definition of “medical or scientific research” may differ from state to state.  New 
Mexico states that medical or scientific research and education include the “retention of gene 
products, genetic information or genetic analysis if the identity of the person or person’s family 
members is not disclosed” but does not explicitly preclude partnerships with private entities.  
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-3 (West 2008). 
 133. Id. 
 134. In its recent guidance, the FDA stated that it “does not intend to object to the use, 
without informed consent, of leftover human specimens . . . in investigations that meet the crite-
ria for exemption from the Investigational Device Exemptions (“IDE”) regulation at 21 C.F.R. 
812.2(c)(3), as long as subject privacy is protected by using only specimens that are not indi-
vidually identifiable.”  U.S. FDA, GUIDANCE ON INFORMED CONSENT FOR IN VITRO DIAGNOSTIC 
DEVICE STUDIES USING LEFTOVER HUMAN SPECIMENS THAT ARE NOT INDIVIDUALLY IDENTIFIABLE 
(2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/oivd/guidance/1588.pdf. 
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The respect for donor control and privacy protection that is gained in states like 
Delaware, Oregon, and Alaska come at a very high cost in terms of research 
efficiency.  Attempts to facilitate research, represented by states like New Mex-
ico, may risk a public backlash, and may be unable to support the most valuable 
kinds of translational research.135  The proposal here, therefore, recommends 
statutory provisions that demonstrate respect for the persons who may donate 
tissue to biobanks while also creating an environment that supports high quality 
translational research. 
A.  Existing Indiana Law Related to Genetic Information 
1.  Repositories or Genetic Information Databases 
Neither the Indiana legislature nor the Indiana courts have addressed indi-
vidual rights relating to DNA or genetic material in the research context.  Indi-
ana does have a DNA database for criminal identification and statistical 
purposes,136 but Indiana courts have only applied this law in the criminal con-
text.137 
2.  Indiana Statutory Definitions of Genetic Testing; Insurance Coverage 
Indiana law defines genetic tests relating to insurance coverage and speci-
fies that the definition only applies for the purposes of regulating certain cate-
gories of insurance coverage.138  The law defines genetic screening tests as tests 
to identify an individual’s chromosomal abnormalities or carrier status to indi-
cate susceptibility to a particular disease.139  Indiana law also prevents health 
care services organizations from basing the provision of health care services on 
these genetic test results.140  Indiana does not extend this definition or offer a 
similar definition for genetic testing for research purposes or genetic testing on 
individual samples removed from an individual and used within a biobank or 
repository setting. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 135. Samples that are collected without informed consent will not have the rich annotation 
many researchers find indispensible to quality research as data from those samples cannot be 
used to support FDA applications, which is a key step in developing medical products. 
 136. See IND. CODE § 10-13-6-13 (2007). 
 137. The Indiana case applies only within the criminal context for the purpose of perpetra-
tor identification.  Indiana case law has clarified the legal status of a criminal defendant’s DNA. 
 The Indiana Supreme Court held that once a defendant’s DNA is used to create a profile for the 
databank, it becomes the property of the databank and the defendant has no possessory or own-
ership interest in the DNA profile.  Smith v. State, 744 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ind. 2001). 
 138. IND. CODE § 27-8-26-1 (2008). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id.; IND. CODE § 27-8-26-5 (2008). 
Copyright 2008, The Trustees of Indiana University. Reproduced with the permission of the Indiana Health Law Review.
244 INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:217 
 
Indiana law provides that insurance companies may obtain the results of 
an individual’s health records or medical information, which may include ge-
netic screening or tests, with a separate written consent.141  If the insurance 
company inadvertently receives genetic information, the insurance company is 
not liable for failing to obtain the informed consent form.142  This provision 
does not apply to life insurance policies.143 
Indiana also has specific provisions which prevent some adverse actions 
by insurance companies as a result of genetic testing.144  For instance, an in-
surer may not require genetic screening or testing, or consider any information 
obtained from genetic screening or testing in a manner adverse to the applicant 
or the applicant’s family that would limit benefits or establish premiums for 
health insurance coverage.145  Additionally, in developing and asking questions 
regarding the medical history of an applicant for health care services coverage, 
an insurer may not ask for the results of genetic tests or ask questions designed 
to ascertain those results.146 
These provisions do not apply to genetic testing on an individual’s sample 
for research purposes, but rather are applicable to genetic screening tests for 
health care purposes.  Unlike other state laws which explicitly prevent insur-
ance companies or other parties from discriminating based on genetic informa-
tion obtained during the research process.147  Indiana law is not clear on this 
issue. 
B.  Approaches to Addressing Indiana’s Lack of Legislation 
1.  Status Quo 
There are both positive implications as well as potential drawbacks from 
relying only on federal regulations from the perspective of Indiana’s various life 
sciences initiatives.  There are at least short-term benefits for industry and re-
searchers because there are no additional or contradictory state laws that could 
impede interstate or international collaborations.  Patience may be a virtue be-
cause Congress or DHHS and FDA may take action to create a harmonized ap-
proach.  Finally, as noted earlier, state courts so far have tended to support 
institutions in cases involving conflicts about tissue control and ownership.  
However, it is also possible that Indiana’s reliance on the status quo could have 
a negative impact on research.  Institutions may be hesitant to engage in genetic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 141. IND. CODE § 16-39-5-2 (2008). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. IND. CODE §§ 27-8-26-6 to 27-8-26-7 (2008). 
 145. Id. 
 146. IND. CODE §§ 27-8-26-5 to 27-8-26-9 (2008). 
 147. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-4 (West 2008). 
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research and biobanking projects due to fears of litigation related to compliance 
uncertainty.  The public may also be reticent to donate specimens to research if 
it takes place outside of standardized regulations, effectively hindering the 
long-term sustainability of this kind of research. 
2.  A Comprehensive Approach for Indiana 
In addition to the state models that already exist, there may be additional 
legal approaches that Indiana could take that both respect and adequately pro-
tect patients while promoting research efficiency.  What follows is a recom-
mendation for a comprehensive set of statutory provisions that address the 
unique concerns relating to biobanking and genetic research.148  Unlike some 
current state models, these provisions include: a comprehensive legal frame-
work for biobanking and genetic research that addresses informed consent, the 
protection of genetic privacy from unauthorized disclosures, a model for liabil-
ity, a plan for implementation by the State Department of Health, and a mecha-
nism for ongoing evaluation and revision. 
a.  Tiered or blanket informed consent for all tissue use 
The legislative approach recommended herein recognizes the human sub-
jects framework of consent and privacy, yet takes measures to streamline the 
consent process without compromising individual privacy protections.  This 
approach strives to embody the idea that research efficiency and respect for in-
dividual control are not mutually exclusive. 
This approach would require obtaining a modified form of actual consent 
from all donors, either by means of a tiered consent (which allows the donor to 
choose permissible research uses of a specimen from among several options) or 
blanket consent (a one-time consent to any future research uses).  It would abol-
ish the use of anonymous samples in research without consent, as well as the 
use of coded samples with the use of IRB exemptions or HIPAA waivers.  Al-
though at first glance this appears to increase hurdles for researchers, it should 
be an acceptable burden for two reasons.  First, researchers recognize that the 
most promising research can be undertaken only in the context of richly anno-
tated samples, and their use usually requires informed consent.  Second, if the 
goal of changing Indiana’s laws is to promote the translation of research into 
clinical products, then the tissues that are banked must be able to support FDA 
applications, which in turn require that explicit informed consent be obtained. 
In recognizing the unique concerns of biobanking and genetic research, 
the statute could relax the traditional informed consent requirements and strike 
a compromise by creating an express authorization that tiered or blanket me-
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. There may well be other approaches that would work, or permutations of this model 
that would better satisfy the diverse interests in the life sciences. 
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thods of consent are permissible if they contain sufficient specificity about the 
research in the informed consent form.  The statute could recognize and permit 
a singular consent and HIPAA authorization for the collection, storage, and use 
based on whether the tiered or blanket form is used.  Although the Privacy Rule 
stipulates that a research institution shall provide an individual with a “specific 
and meaningful”149 description of the research prior to authorizing use of the 
individual’s PHI, some have argued that this provision does not prohibit or in-
validate an individual’s authorization to use his or her PHI for future research 
in general.150 
Allowing each individual the right to decide whether or not to participate 
in biobank research respects autonomy and individual dignity if the informed 
consent form discloses in good faith as much information as is practicable.  Fu-
ture legislation with respect to benefits should note that no personal benefit 
from contribution is expected to arise, and the institution will not provide the 
individual with any information relating to the results of any genetic testing or 
research.  With respect to risks to the individual, the consent should include the 
immediate physical dangers of extracting the specimen, any threats to informa-
tion confidentiality, and insurability and employability based on genetic infor-
mation.  In addition, disclosures should include the types of genetic research 
that may be performed, partnerships with private entities, and plans to develop 
commercial products. 
Despite heightened respect for the donor’s initial decision to donate or de-
cline participation, the institution would gain immense control once the indi-
vidual donates the specimen and the institution codes it.  This solution could 
also allow for individual withdrawal of the coded specimen and information, 
but would expressly deny donors a right to transfer, direct, or manage the spe-
cimen once donated.  The loss of control once the individual donates the spe-
cimen would also mean that this solution would not explicitly recognize any 
individual property right in genetic information or a genetic specimen.  This 
solution would also prohibit re-identifying the specimens and connecting any 
genetic information to the individual’s identity. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 149. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(l)(ii) (2008). 
 150. David Wendler notes that the Privacy Rule currently allows individuals to make a 
single general authorization of their PHI “to be used in future research to find better ways to 
treat and cure disease.”  The DHHS has suggested that the Privacy Rule as written contains two 
shortcomings: (1) individuals authorizing use of their PHI lack the necessary information to 
make an informed decision; and (2) the Privacy Rule does not require IRB or privacy board 
review of research uses and disclosures made with individual authorization.  Wendler proposes 
that one time general consent and authorization may be permissible if an IRB reviews and ap-
proves future research that would be consistent with the individual’s original authorization.  
David Wendler, One-Time General Consent for Research on Biological Samples, 166 ARCHIVES 
OF INTERNAL MED. 1449, 1450 (2006). 
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b.  Disclosures and re-identification 
Specimens should remain coded and re-identification of the specimens 
should be prohibited.  Indiana law should compensate for the current lack of 
federal protections against unauthorized disclosures of genetic information to 
employers and insurance companies.  This policy would minimize public fear 
and concern about potential discrimination that might otherwise hinder willing-
ness to donate.  This policy could also prevent conditioning an application for 
employment or insurance coverage on obtaining a genetic test, on particular 
results of a genetic test, or any other actual, perceived, or assumed genetic char-
acteristics. 
c.  Liability 
The legislature should adopt a model of civil liability that recognizes the 
importance of compliance with relevant consent or privacy provisions, and also 
serves as a possible deterrent from unauthorized disclosures connecting an in-
dividual to genetic information.  Criminal liability is not advisable, as it may 
unnecessarily deter research and development interests and investments. 
This solution would recognize that a limited class of individuals has 
standing to bring a claim, recognizing only the individual, the individual’s im-
mediate family members, and the attorney general.  Despite the narrow class of 
individuals with standing, the law would recognize the broad class of potential 
breaching parties and extend a duty and liability to the researchers, physicians, 
institutions, and research partners involved in the breach.  To prevent hin-
drances to research, the law would not rely on a strict liability model but rather 
outline a series of violations based on mental intent.  Violations could be based 
on a tiered level, ranging from negligent violations to willful violations.  One 
remedy may include temporary injunctive relief at the minimum, irrespective of 
the level of intent.  Additional remedies could be awarded based on a showing 
of a particular level of intent, and the law would accordingly specify a mini-
mum amount of money damages based on the nature of the breaching party’s 
intent. 
d.  Implementation of legislative changes 
A practical way of implementing these legislative changes and creating 
uniformity among research institutions would be to charge the Indiana State 
Department of Health with the responsibility of educating Indiana citizens (in-
cluding health care providers), assisting in the integration of genomic medicine 
into clinical care, and providing ongoing assessment of Indiana’s genetic re-
search laws. 
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(I)  Outreach and education 
Increasing the public’s genomic literacy should occur in several environ-
ments by including a legislative provision requiring the Department of Health 
to introduce educational components in schools, inform the general public via 
media outlets, and further educate the professional community.  The Depart-
ment of Health could partner with the Department of Education to integrate 
information about genetics and health care into the public school health curricu-
lum.  The Department of Health’s public education effort should target varied 
media outlets such as public service advertising and informational websites, in 
addition to brochures and pamphlets disseminated by health care providers.  
Recently revised umbilical cord blood collection laws in California provide a 
useful model of how to inform the public of important research endeavors while 
notifying them of the legal requirements related to donation.  The California 
statute lists various methods to increase public awareness through the use of 
brochures, television, print media, radio, internet websites, outdoor advertising, 
and other media.  Similar to cord blood banking, the public should be fully in-
formed of the benefits of genetic research which could be accomplished in a 
comparable manner.151  The Department of Health should also devise a system 
to provide ongoing education and training to health care professionals to in-
crease awareness of available technologies and promote integration of transla-
tional medicine into health care delivery. 
(II)  Integration of genomics into personal health care 
Research using banked materials should yield improvements in transla-
tional medicine, such as genetic screening tests and targeted therapies.  Indiana 
law should describe the importance of returning broad public health benefits 
based on ongoing field advancements by increasing the use of genetic screen-
ing, counseling, and targeted therapies to be coordinated by the Department of 
Health. 
Consideration may also be given to how genetic screening tests and per-
sonalized medicine will be provided as a viable health care option, which in-
cludes financing and reimbursement issues that impact genetic services 
delivery.  This section could specify how public and private insurance will clas-
sify the use of genetic screening and testing services and give the Department 
of Health the task of compiling additional findings relating to data on reim-
bursement rates, financing, delivery, and any potential changes needed to en-
courage public utilization of genetic services. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 151. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 123370 (West 2008). 
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(III)  Evaluation and ongoing advisement 
The Indiana State Legislature and Department of Health should develop a 
system of review to assess the progress of the goals enumerated by the Depart-
ment of Health.  The Department could appoint a committee to monitor and 
address possible barriers to implementation of collection initiatives, new re-
search discoveries, and empirical data to show improvements in diagnosis and 
treatment of patients using the state’s genetic services. 
The Department of Health should create a mechanism such as an advisory 
group to remain knowledgeable and compliant with relevant legal changes at 
the federal level and in case law.  Although the recently proposed Genomic and 
Personalized Medicine Act of 2006152 has not been enacted, the Congressional 
pattern of passing similar legislation such as the PREEMIE Act of 2006153 sug-
gests that Congress may enact federal laws to promote the development of bio-
banking initiatives.  This type of law may provide financial support through 
federal grants or clarify ambiguities in current regulations and guidance by, for 
example, delineating substantive requirements for an informed consent form or 
defining ownership.  Similarly, if the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act (or similar legislation) passes on the federal level, state legislation and prac-
tices should reflect prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of genetic 
information.  Additionally, the advisory group should create a working plan to 
educate both the public and professional communities on how to comply with 
these legal changes.  This advisory group should also monitor updates in case 
law across the country because even nonbinding precedent in this subject area 
has strongly influenced subsequent dispute resolutions. 
The Department of Health should also assign a committee to monitor cur-
rent ethical, legal, and social issues related to biobank research, including unre-
solved or ambiguous issues related to informed consent, privacy and 
confidentiality, commercialization, and how to determine the benefits that ac-
crue to the public through better health care and/or local economic develop-
ment. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 152. The Genomic and Personalized Medicine Act proposes standardizing portions of in-
formed consent forms “including those that allow multiple uses of data for research purposes” 
which suggests a move toward permitting tiered or blanket consent in the biobanking context 
and/or data sharing arrangements.  This bill would also make recommendations to definitively 
address ownership of the samples and information.  Enactment of S. 3822, or a similar law, 
could standardize legal approaches and render moot portions of the current ethical debate based 
on legal ambiguities.  Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act, S. 3822, 109th Cong. (2006), 
available at http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/109/s/s3822.pdf. 
 153. PREEMIE Act, S. 707 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://www.govtrack.us/data 
/us/bills.text/109/s/s707.pdf. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Biobanking’s promises of advances in translational research are contin-
gent upon collection of the public’s biological specimens, which requires main-
taining the trust of both the public and potential investors to support 
translational research.  Previous solutions have erroneously submitted to the 
proposition that research efficiency and respect for donors are mutually exclu-
sive.  This has resulted in some instances of donor dissatisfaction and legal bat-
tles, a losing solution for both donors and institutions.  A comprehensive 
legislative solution can work to minimize legal uncertainty related to the collec-
tion, use, storage, and disclosure of individuals’ sensitive and invaluable ge-
netic samples and information.  Educating and engaging both the public and 
institutions through such a solution will streamline the biobanking process, en-
couraging altruistic donation while producing beneficial research innovations. 
Copyright 2008, The Trustees of Indiana University. Reproduced with the permission of the Indiana Health Law Review.
